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Isolation Methods in Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoCs

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Summary

The Zynq® UltraScale+™ MPSoC provides multiple processing subsystems including an application processing unit containing four Cortex™-A53 cores (APU subsystem), two Cortex-R5 cores (RPU subsystem), a platform management unit (PMU), as well as a configuration security unit (CSU). A user-specified number of MicroBlaze™ processors could also be located in the programmable logic (PL). When multiple software teams are involved in system development, these processing units can potentially interfere with each other. In order to prevent the possibility of such interference, isolation is necessary. Due to the nature of security and functional safety applications, isolation is a requirement.

The Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC provides the Xilinx® memory protection unit (XMPU) and the Xilinx peripheral protection unit (XPPU) for hardware protection of memory and peripherals. These protection units complement the isolation provided by TrustZone (TZ), by the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC memory management units (MMUs) and the System Memory Management Unit (SMMU). The methods outlined in this document allow a system to be built using a structured isolation methodology. This application note describes how to isolate the subsystems in a Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC system using XMPU, XPPU, and TZ.

The [reference design files](#) for this application note can be downloaded from the Xilinx website. For detailed information about the design files, see the [Reference Design](#) section of this application note.

Note: This application note targets MPSoC devices as an example. All isolation methods discussed in this application note are also applicable to RFSoc devices.

Introduction

Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC designs use multiple subsystems. The subsystems include one or more processing units or other masters (e.g., PMU, DMAs, custom PL IP, etc), memories, and peripherals. Interference occurs when a master in one subsystem accesses a memory region or peripheral that it is not intended to access. Interference can result from software bugs or from a malicious actor.

In this application note, the isolation methods in the Vivado® design suite defines a system that uses isolated subsystems. The subsystems are the application processing unit (APU), real-time processing unit (RPU), and PMU. The objective of these methods is to ensure that each subsystem executes with freedom from interference (FFI) from other subsystems. These methods configure the protection units and TZ for subsystem isolation. The system hardware

generated in the Vivado design suite is exported as a hardware platform for use by the Xilinx Vitis Core Development Kit. Vitis will be used to create the software systems. In addition to the basic software that runs on subsystems, Vitis can be used to create applications that control and monitor the protection unit and TZ functionality. The software allows the developer to include an error reaction to interference of a subsystem.

After a system is defined and implemented, it needs to be validated for basic functionality of the subsystems, including any subsystem intercommunication. The isolation between subsystems can be verified by injecting faults that invoke protection unit and TZ isolation functionality. This includes testing of the error reaction to the interference defined by the system architect.

This application note targets a bare metal system but the methodology provides a framework for isolation development in systems that use operating systems. This application note includes:

- [UltraScale MPSoC Architecture](#)
- [Isolation Tools](#)
- [Known Limitations to Isolation](#)

Hardware and Software Requirements

The hardware and software requirements for the reference design system include:


- Xilinx ZCU102 evaluation platform
- Two USB type-A to USB mini-B cables (for UART, JTAG communication)
- Secure Digital (SD) memory card
- Xilinx Vitis 2021.1
- Xilinx Vivado Design Suite 2021.1
- Serial communication terminal software (such as Tera Term or PuTTY)
- Warm restart patch required for releases prior to 2021.1. For more information, see [Software Patch Requirements \(2019.1/2019.2\)](#).

UltraScale MPSoC Architecture

This section discusses the hardware components in the UltraScale+ MPSoC architecture that are used to create subsystems and the protection units used to ensure FFI. At a high level, Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoCs consist of a processing system (PS) and programmable logic (PL). Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC regions are also defined by power domains, including the full power domain (FPD) and low power domain (LPD) regions. Within these power domains are islands whose power can be controlled by the user.

There are also four fundamental memory regions. These memory regions are the double data rate (DDR) memory, on-chip memory (OCM), tightly-coupled memory (TCM), and advanced eXtensible interface (AXI) block RAM in the PL. Access to memory is controlled by the memory controllers, direct memory access controllers (DMACs), memory management units (MMUs), SMMUs, and the XMPUs. The peripherals, mostly in the LPD, include devices in the input/output unit (IOU), and other devices such as the gigabit Ethernet MAC (GEM). The GEM and USB peripherals function as both master and slave AXI devices. Access to the peripherals can be dedicated or shared. However, when a peripheral is shared it is up to the user to arbitrate access. Isolation of the peripherals is provided using the XPPU.

[Figure 1](#) shows the location of the XMPUs and the XPPU in the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC. There are eight XMPUs. Six of the XMPUs protect transactions into the DDR, one protects the OCM, and one protects transactions into the FPD. There is one XPPU, which is located at the input to the LPD.



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Figure 1: Zynq UltraScale+ Architecture


The hardware provides other components that can be used for isolation: system memory management unit (SMMU), AXI timeout blocks (ATBs), AXI isolation blocks (AIBs), and TZ. The SMMU provides memory management for non-CPU masters such as direct memory access controllers (DMACs). The SMMU provides isolation between two different processors that have access to the same memory and the SMMU is commonly used in conjunction with hypervisors. The ATBs ensure that AXI transactions for which there is not a slave response do not halt. The AIBs facilitate the transition to a powered down state for regions that are powered down. Powering down unused regions is important in isolation.

Several types of access control need to be used in conjunction with the protection units and TZ. AXI transactions can be either read or write. However, a section with code or data constants should not allow writes. To accommodate this isolation requirement, a memory region's read/write permissions can be defined using TZ and the Xilinx protection units (XMPU and XPPU).

Note: While the protection units use the master IDs to enforce isolation, TZ achieves this using the AXI AxProt bits.

The Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC APU is an Arm® v8 architecture and as such supports four exception levels. These exception levels are used to control privileges at the application level (i.e., each application has its own exception level). The Arm® v8 architecture exception levels (ELs) are exclusively for applications running on the APU. The RPU and PMU do not support them. However, the RPU supports modes to control privilege and it is similar to the concept of exception levels. For more information, see <https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0024/latest/fundamentals-of-armv8/changing-exception-levels#BEIJHGDA>.

Powering down unused regions and islands is a valuable tool not just for isolation but also for general security and safety practices. A component cannot interfere with other components if it is powered down. [Figure 2](#) shows an overview of the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC power islands.



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Figure 2: Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Power Domains

Isolation Tools

The Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC has many tools to aid in the development of an isolated design. The primary tools are discussed here.

TrustZone

The isolation methods in this application note rely on the use of protection units and TZ. Protection units provide isolation by detecting violating AXI transactions. Xilinx differentiates between the isolation provided by the protection units and isolation provided by TZ using the terms *transaction isolation* and *state isolation*, respectively. State isolation can be more comprehensive than transaction isolation. With state isolation, the processor, IP, memory, and interrupts in subsystems are assigned secure world (SW) or non-secure world (NSW) settings. The subsystem can context switch between SW and NSW states, thereby improving device utilization at the expense of software complexity.

The reference design provides a critical framework to start using TZ. Because of its complexity, realization of all the advantages of TZ typically requires running a trusted execution environment (TEE) and support from a Xilinx ecosystem partner. For more information, see *Isolate Security-Critical Applications on Zynq UltraScale+ Devices* (WP516) [Ref 5]. In the included reference system (see [Figure 13](#)), the APU and its memory and peripherals are TZ non-secure while the RPU and PMU along with their dedicated memory and peripherals are TZ secure. While sharing is allowed (not typically recommended), the level must be consistent with the level of the master. For example, a non-secure master cannot access a secure memory or peripheral. However, a secure master can access either a secure or non-secure memory or peripheral.

In the typical Arm use case, TZ uses hardware and software functionality to provide isolation. TZ defines SW and NSW operational states. Because functional safety (FS) applications sometimes have isolation requirements analogous to security applications, FS applications use the terms *safety critical* and *non-safety critical* in lieu of secure and non-secure, respectively. For brevity, the terms *safe world* and *non-safe world* will be used so as to keep the same acronym as the security context (secure world and non-secure world) because they are analogous.

The intent is to ensure that safety critical functions cannot be corrupted by non-safety critical functions. In some, but not all TZ systems, the same CPU multiplexes between the SW and NSW because that is an efficient use of resources. This usually requires a relatively complex context switch. In the general case, however, trusted software runs in the SW using a standalone board support package (BSP) or a small operating system in the SW. NSW software runs on a rich operating system, often Linux, which generally has a wider attack surface.

As an example, secure boot, secure firmware update, key management, reset control, power management, and other critical system functions are performed in the SW. Non-critical applications such as status reporting, non-essential analytics, and performance monitoring are performed in the NSW as a Linux application. The isolation provided by TZ minimizes the probability that a cyber attack or software bug in the NSW affects code or data in the SW.

Because the context switch between code running in a SW and a NSW is complex, it is easier if one CPU is statically configured to operate in the SW, and a second CPU is statically configured to operate in the NSW. With the number of CPUs provided in the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC, this is a viable option. As an example, the R5-0 can operate statically in the SW while the A53-0 operates statically in the NSW.

In TZ, masters, slaves, and memory are designated to function in either the SW or the NSW. A master in the SW has access to slave and memory belonging to both the SW and the NSW (i.e., everything). A master in the NSW has access to slave and memory belonging only to the NSW. An access attempt by a NSW master to a SW peripheral or memory is not allowed. The illegal access will be rejected by the slave, generally with a SLVERR or DECERR response.

The TZ hardware isolation on the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC uses the AxPROT[1] signal on the AXI bus as the filtering mechanism to determine if an access is legal. This is used on both the Arm advanced high-performance bus (AHB) and the advanced peripheral bus (APB) in the PS. The AXI interconnect IP used in the PL also supports AxPROT[1] allowing relatively straightforward TZ isolation in the PL⁽¹⁾. MicroBlaze interfaces can be setup as secure or non-secure and use the AxPROT signals. MicroBlaze interfaces can be setup as secure or non-secure and use the AxPROT signals.


System Protection Units

The Arm TrustZone technology tags the security level of each AXI transaction as described in more detail in [TrustZone](#). The XMPU and the XPPU verify that a specific system master is explicitly allowed to access an address by assigning specific addresses ranges (memories and peripherals) to either the secure world or non-secure world TrustZone tags.

XMPU

Fundamental to any secure or functionally safe system is the isolation of memory. The XMPU gives the user the ability to partition user-defined regions of memory and allocate them to specific isolated subsystems. [Figure 3](#) shows a functional diagram of the XMPU.

1. It is up to the user to design cores that make use of these bits.



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Figure 3: XMPU Functionality

There are six XMPUs at the input to the DDRC interface and one XMPU at the input to the OCM. There is also an XMPU at the input of the FPD interconnect for protection of FPD controllers (SATA and PCIe®). The XMPU configuration generated by the Vivado tools is exported to the first stage boot loader (FSBL). It is the FSBL that sets up the isolation configuration registers. As an additional safety or security check, these registers can be read to verify their state. As part of the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC functional safety software test library (STL), Xilinx provides the capability to run self tests on the XMPU. These libraries are located in the Functional Safety Lounge⁽¹⁾. Each XMPU protects up to 16 regions, with regions aligned on either 1 MB (DDR) or 4 KB (OCM) boundaries. For each region, the memory protection is based on two checks:

- The address of the transaction is within the region defined by START_ADDR and END_ADDR.
- The master ID of the incoming transaction is allowed.

While it is possible to reconfigure these registers at runtime, it is not recommended for safe or secure systems. Such systems typically require these registers to be locked. This is recommended for the XMPU, but not for the XPPU. A conflict exists where locking the XPPU configuration prevents any interrupts from it from being cleared (the register to clear interrupts is also locked). Due to this conflict, the reference design added an additional subsystem, the

1. The Xilinx Functional Safety Lounge is a paid access repository for Functional Safety documentation and libraries. The no-fee landing site is www.xilinx.com/applications/industrial/functional-safety.html.

PMU, to be the XPPU master. In this example, the XPPU configuration is not locked but is only writable by the PMU subsystem. Framework code for the PMU is provided as an interrupt handler. This framework allows for additional code to be added based upon the user's error reaction requirements.

Note: This conflict only exists for the XPPU. The XMPU can be locked without affecting the ability to clear an interrupt.

The START_ADDR, END_ADDR, and master ID (MID) values are defined in the system setup and readable in the XMPU register space. While the APU has a single master ID, the RPU has two possibilities. If configured in lock-step mode, a single R5 master ID is used. If configured in split mode, each R5 has its own master ID. If an access violates any of the protection criteria, the XMPU prevents this access by applying a poisoning method.

If an illegal transaction is attempted, the XMPU asserts AxUser[10] but the transaction is passed to the memory controller. This mechanism is referred to as *poison by attribute*. The transaction is gated by the end point, not the XMPU itself. In the case of the DDR, the user has choices of how to deal with the invalid transaction (none of which actually allow it). While there is a second way of poisoning the transaction (by address), poisoning by attribute is recommended for the XMPU.

Optionally, the XMPU can generate an interrupt such that an error reaction can be included in the interrupt handler. See the System Protection Unit chapter in the *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Technical Reference Manual* (UG1085) [Ref 2] for additional information on the XMPU.

XPPU

The XPPU allows for protecting peripherals, message buffers, inter-processor interrupts (IPI) and communications, as well as Quad SPI flash memory. It is best deployed at the system **choke points** where all traffic to the protected objects will pass through, thus maximizing the protection coverage. In comparison with the XMPU, the XPPU uses finer grained address matching and provides more address apertures. Additionally, where the XMPU discourages the use of address poisoning in lieu of attribute poisoning, the XPPU only allows address poisoning. The address poisoning approach is shown in [Figure 3](#) on the left side. The violating access is deviated to a certain memory area that is reserved for this purpose. A master ID list is used to define the masters that are allowed to access peripherals. Eight of the 20 master IDs are predefined. An aperture permission list (APL) specifies permissions on peripheral addresses that masters can access. Permissions are based on master ID.

A functional diagram of the XPPU is shown in [Figure 4](#).




Figure 4: XPPU Functional Diagram

Both the *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Processing System LogiCORE IP Product Guide* (PG201) [Ref 3] and *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Technical Reference Manual* (UG1085) [Ref 2] provide additional information on the master ID and aperture permission lists, permission checking, and error handling.


Memory Management and Protection Units

In addition to the Xilinx Protection Units, the Arm Cortex R5 and A53 systems have typical memory protection (memory protection unit and memory management unit, respectively) allowing for additional access control within each processor complex. A highlight is given here but more detail can be found in the respective technical reference manuals.

The memory protection unit (MPU) of the Arm Cortex R5 allows for creating 0, 12, or 16 memory regions. This allows for individual protection attributes to be set for each region. Each region is defined by the base address and size. Overlapping of regions is allowed where sharing a specific address space is desired. Additionally, the memory management unit (MMU) in the ARMv8 architecture supports two-stage address translation, which allows the users' OS and hypervisor to have their own translation stages.

Each Arm Cortex A53 allows for more granular region definition. Rather than specify the number of regions, it specifies the granularity of a region (4 KB or 64 KB). Each address region is assigned its own ID (ASID).

The Xilinx system memory management unit (SMMU) extends the MMU capability of the processor cores into the rest of the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC architecture for any other master/DMA capable devices using six translation buffer units (TBUs). A high-level usage diagram can be seen in Figure 5.



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Figure 5: Example of SMMU System Locations

AXI Isolation Block


Originally intended to isolate a master from its slave in preparation for powering down, the AXI isolation blocks (AIBs) can be used to enhance isolation. These blocks are spread throughout the entire PS of the device. They can be configured to block undesired accesses and generate a SLVERR response when an illegal access is attempted. The control registers for the AIB can be protected by the XPPU.

Exception Levels

The ARMv8 architecture allows for setting up four exception levels (EL0 – EL3) allowing for additional access control within the Arm A53 complex. These exception levels are best described as follows:

- **EL0:** Lowest software execution privilege (Sometimes referred to as the unprivileged execution level). User applications typically run at this level.
- **EL1:** First true “privileged” level. Operating systems typically run at this level. This level provides basic support for the non-secure state.
- **EL2:** Higher level of privilege adding support for processor virtualization. Hypervisors typically run at this level. This level provides support for processor virtualization.
- **EL3:** Most privileged level adding support for a secure state. Secure monitor code runs at this level. For the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC, this is the Arm Trusted Firmware (ATF).

A graphical depiction of this structure (along with TrustZone) is shown in [Figure 6](#).



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Figure 6: Armv8 Exception Levels with TrustZone

Interprocessor Communication

Most systems, even with isolation, require some sort of communication between subsystems. As an example, the APU subsystem can support an Ethernet interface that receives and transmits data from or to a server for both the APU and RPU subsystems. The RPU subsystem can generate log files and transmit them to the APU subsystem, which then transfers them to the server using Ethernet. Similarly, a server can send commands to the RPU subsystem using the APU subsystem Ethernet, which then uses the inter-subsystem communication mechanism to transfer the command to the RPU subsystem.

The Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC provides IPI buffers to support interprocessor communication between the APU, RPU, and PMU subsystems. The exchange between the APU, RPU, and PMU subsystems uses 32-byte request and response buffers. [Figure 7](#) shows one specific example using interprocessor communication between the APU and RPU subsystems using IPI in the reference design. This is just one example using IPI. Communication can be initiated by all participants of the IPI system. See the *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Technical Reference Manual* (UG1085) [[Ref 2](#)] for more information on using IPI.




Figure 7: Interprocessor Communication Using IPI

The protocol for the message exchange is for the requesting subsystem (APU) to trigger an interrupt to the receiving subsystem (RPU). The interrupt triggering subsystem fills the data in the IPI channel's request buffer. The RPU interrupt receiving master reads the content of the request buffer. If the interrupt receiving master needs to provide response data to the interrupt triggering master, the response buffer is used. The response buffer is read by the triggering master (APU).

The Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC provides eleven IPI channels for inter-subsystem communication. Out of the eleven, channels 3 – 6 are dedicated to the PMU, and the remaining are configurable as masters. The inter-subsystem communication is supported in hardware and uses the **xipipsu** device driver. Each channel provides six registers used to trigger the interrupt and check status. [Figure 8](#) shows the hardware support for interprocessor interrupts in the Vivado design suite. For the purposes of this lab, the default settings will be used.

Note: Care should be taken when configuring the IPI channels when using Linux. The Arm Trusted Firmware (ATF) expects a specific configuration. Changing the default settings may cause issues with the default ATF configuration.




Figure 8: Vivado Design Suite IPI Communication Setup

Handling Interrupts with the PMU

The XMPU and XPPU optionally generate an interrupt when there is a memory or peripheral access violation. The system can be set up so that the interrupt is connected to either the APU GIC, RPU GIC, or AXI INTC, allowing an interrupt handler to be implemented by the APU, RPU, or PMU.

The error reaction in the interrupt handler is defined by the system requirements. For example, in one system, the reaction might be to power down the system and require intervention to restart the system. In another system, in which availability is a prevalent requirement, the system might remain functional. In this case, the error reaction might be to log the error, notify a server for possible scheduled maintenance, and continue operation.

Figure 9 shows the PMU FW code for handling an error. The file shown is `xpfw_xpu.c` and can be found under the BSP tree in Vitis. The message (shown later) is printed from the `XPfw_Xpu_IntrHandler` function. This handler can be modified to implement the required error reaction.




Figure 9: PMU FW Code for Error Handling

Fault Injection/Application Fault Error Handling

For functional safety and security systems, it is not sufficient to add safe or secure features without testing that such features work. For functional features, this is straight forward (if it runs it works). However, for security or safety related features, system functionality is proof of nothing because such features might only be noticeable in the presence of a fault. Because it is not practical to wait for a fault to happen, it is typically necessary to inject faults into the system. In the example design, it will be necessary to prove isolation by attempting to violate it.

To verify isolation between multiple isolation regions, faults will be injected by writing code to perform illegal memory and peripheral accesses through TZ protected XMPU and XPPU gates, and verifying that such accesses are blocked and notification is given to the system. Additional symbols will be added to the PMU code to enable detailed error messaging while additional error handling routines will be added to the application code to allow it to run through an isolated violation. However, these symbols are optional and only for outputting error messages to the UARTs. They are not required or even desired in a real-world system.

To allow the application that is performing the illegal reads and writes, it is necessary to construct an error handler to deal with it. This allows the application to run through the fault rather than end abruptly. How a system handles interrupts is entirely up to the developer and the system requirements for interrupt handling. This example is best used for demonstration and as a placeholder for the actual user code.

The example application running in the APU domain generates two types of interrupts: sync and error aborts. The actual error type depends on the corresponding transaction type (read or write). Each must have their own handler. The error type depends on the transaction type: read or write. The requirements for two types of errors comes from the Arm architecture itself, not the Xilinx-specific implementation. [Figure 10](#) shows the error handler code for both. For sync aborts, the code sets a Boolean variable, letting the main routine know an abort happened. It then steps forward one instruction to prevent a loop when returning to the same offending statement. Error aborts simply log that an abort happened. The application determines if the statement “passed” or “failed” depending upon the value of this Boolean. [Figure 11](#) shows the code to register the custom handlers. A similar handler for the RPU system was also generated but it only required the sync error handler because only one interrupt type is generated in that system. These handlers are for demonstration purposes and not what would be expected in a real-world system. How to handle such errors is up to the developer and the requirements of the system being developed.

```

void SAbort_SyncIntHandler(int Data)
{
    exceptionDetected = true;
    usleep(DELAY_COUNT);

    //update the return address to prevent returning to the same offending read transaction
    __asm__ __volatile__ ("mrs x1, ELR_EL3");
    __asm__ __volatile__ ("add x1, x1, #4");
    __asm__ __volatile__ ("msr ELR_EL3, x1");
    return ;
}

void SAbort_SErrorAbortIntHandler(int Data)
{
    exceptionDetected = true;
    usleep(DELAY_COUNT);
    return ;
}

```

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Figure 10: Application Interrupt Handlers

```

static int SetupInterruptSystem(void)
{
    //Connect the interrupt controller interrupt handler to the hardware
    //interrupt handling logic in the ARM processor.

    Xil_ExceptionRegisterHandler(XIL_EXCEPTION_ID_SYNC_INT,
        (Xil_ExceptionHandler) SAbort_SyncIntHandler,
        XIL_EXCEPTION_ID_SYNC_INT);

    Xil_ExceptionRegisterHandler(XIL_EXCEPTION_ID_ERROR_ABORT_INT,
        (Xil_ExceptionHandler) SAbort_SErrorAbortIntHandler,
        XIL_EXCEPTION_ID_ERROR_ABORT_INT);

    //Enable interrupts in the ARM
    Xil_ExceptionEnable();

    return 0;
}

```

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Figure 11: Application Interrupt Handler Registration

Known Limitations to Isolation

There are some limitations to isolation that the user must be aware of. These limitations are documented here.

A-53 cores

There are use cases where it is desirable to physically isolate each core of the quad A-53 processor complex. However, unlike the cores of the R-5 processor complex, each A53 core has the same master ID. This makes it impossible to use features like XMPU and XPPU to isolate them. If such isolation is desired, it must be implemented at a software level, using either a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) or a hypervisor.

CCI-400

While useful to keep transactions coherent, it must be pointed out that the CCI-400 IP is capable of mastering its own transactions. This creates a potential conflict as it generates these transactions using the same master ID as the R5_0 processor core. This can result in isolation errors. The *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Technical Reference Manual* (UG1085) [Ref 2] recommends adding the R5_0 to the access list of the memory region whose transactions are being mastered by the CCI-400. While this addresses the access error, it is not typically practical in an isolation use case. Two alternative options can resolve this issue:

1. Move the R5_0 application over to the R5_1 core and keep R5_0 either unused or capable of being in the same isolation region as the memory region whose transactions are driven by the CCI-400.
2. Disable Cache Coherency for the region being protected by an XMPU.

XPPU Configuration Locking

There is no practical way to **lock** the XPPU as there is with the XMPU. Protection of the XPPU configuration is best achieved by placing the XPPU configuration register in the PMU Firmware isolation system and only that system.

Isolation Reference Design

The first step in developing a system on the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC is defining the functionality in terms of the architecture. This means defining the tasks performed in the APU, RPU, and PL. In most systems, there is a joint requirement that the subsystems be isolated to perform their tasks without interference.

It is quite common for subsystems to require some level of communication between them. To support this and maintain isolation between them, there are two common methods:

inter-processor interrupt (IPI) and shared memory. IPI relies on a common message buffer and integrated interrupt system while shared memory creates a partition of memory shared between the two subsystems. In IPI, the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC architecture handles the notification of the messages while shared memory requires the user to create a similar notification architecture. Each method has its merits depending upon user requirements.

In some cases, there are reasons for subsystems to share resources. Device configuration is a good example where non-volatile memory (NVM) stores the boot image for all subsystems, loaded at power-up. Another example is the DDR controller (DDRC). While it is possible to add an AXI DDRC in the PL, this increases the resources used, which increases the cost. The isolation is increased, but the effect of using the added DDRC resources on reliability is less clear.

When using development boards such as the ZCU102 or UltraZed-EG, there might be constraints in the resources used by each subsystem. The multiplexed I/O (MIO) and device board interfaces might present resource limitations that do not exist on a custom board. This reference design specifically targets the ZCU102 development board.

Software Patch Requirements (2019.1/2019.2)


There is an issue discovered in 2019.1 and 2019.2 where the warm restart function conflicts with isolation. To support warm restart, the PMU copies the FSBL to DDR. This causes two key conflicts:

- It requires the PMU to read OCM in this reference design, to which it does not have access.
- Violates security tenets if authentication and/or encryption are used for the FSBL.
 - Copies the FSBL outside of the chip in DDR without encrypting it.
 - Copies the hash of the FSBL for integrity but stores that hash outside in DDR as well.

For more information, see [AR73475](#). The following patches are required for this lab:

- 0001-sw_apps-zynqmp_fsbl-Fix-logic-in-writing-FSBL-runnin.patch
- 0002-sw_apps-zynqmp_pmufw-Make-FSBL-copy-as-user-option.patch

When installed, open the `xpfw_config.h` file and change the value of `USE_DDR_FOR_APU_RESTART_VAL` from (1) to (0) as shown in [Figure 12](#). While it is possible to make this change on a project by project basis, failure to disable this option (which is enabled by default) can cause isolation errors in most isolated systems. It is recommended to disable it in the patch repository rather than in each PMU firmware project. The `xpfw_config.h` file can be found at `<local_patch_repository>/embeddedsw/lib/sw_apps/zynqmp_pmufw/src`.



```
xpfw_config.h
151
152 #define CONNECT_PMU_GPO_2_VAL          (1U)
153 #define CONNECT_PMU_GPO_3_VAL          (1U)
154 #define CONNECT_PMU_GPO_4_VAL          (1U)
155 #define CONNECT_PMU_GPO_5_VAL          (1U)
156
157 #define SECURE_ACCESS_VAL                (0U)
158 #define USE_DDR_FOR_APU_RESTART_VAL     (0U)
159
```

X23827-041320

Figure 12: Altered USE_DDR_FOR_APU_RESTART_VAL Option in 2019.1/2019.2 Patch

Note: For more information on installing patches, see [Answer Record 72710](#). While a patch for 2019.2 is shown previously, this lab targets 2021.1. Vitis 2020.1 and beyond has this patch built in so user action for this lab is not required.

System Overview

Figure 13 shows the reference system, which consists of three subsystems. In this design, the APU subsystem is considered a non-secure system (colored green) while the PMU and RPU subsystems are both considered secure systems (colored red). Where non-secure regions are shared with secure masters they are colored both red and green.




Figure 13: Isolation Reference Design

The reference system partitions the PS as follows:

- The DDR is split into three regions. The APU subsystem owns addresses 0x0000_0000 to 0x01FF_FFFF and shares 0x6000_0000 to 0x600F_FFFF with the RPU subsystem. The region 0x4000_0000 to 0x40FF_FFFF is owned by the RPU subsystem.
- OCM is split in two regions. Address range 0xFFFC_0000 to 0xFFFF_0000 is owned by the RPU subsystem, while the remaining addresses (0xFFFF_0000 to 0xFFFF_FFFF) are shared between the APU and RPU subsystems.
- The R5 owns the entire R5_0_ATCM region.
- The APU subsystem owns TTC0 and SWDT0, while sharing GPIO with the RPU subsystem and UART0 with the PMU subsystem. The RPU subsystem owns TTC1, SWDT1, and I2C1, and shares UART1 with the PMU subsystem.

A more detailed address map is shown in [Table 1](#).

Table 1: System Address Map

APU Subsystem				
A53-0			NSW	
OCM	0xFFFF_0000	64 KB	NSW	R/W
DDR_LOW	0x0000_0000	32 MB	NSW	R/W
DDR_LOW	0x6000_0000	1 MB	NSW	R/W
UART0			NSW	R/W
GPIO			NSW	R/W
SWDT0			NSW	R/W
TTC0			NSW	R/W
RPU Subsystem				
R5-0			SW	
OCM	0xFFFC_0000	192 KB	SW	R/W
OCM	0xFFFF_0000	64 KB	NSW	R/W
DDR_LOW	0x4000_0000	16 MB	SW	R/W
DDR_LOW	0x6000_0000	1 MB	NSW	R/W
R5_0_ATCM_GLOBAL			SW	R/W
SWDT1			SW	R/W
UART1			SW	R/W
TTC1			SW	R/W
I2C1			SW	R/W
GPIO			NSW	R/W
CRF_APB			SW	R/W
CRL_APB			SW	R/W
RPU			SW	R/W
EFUSE			SW	R/W
IOU_SLCR			SW	R/W
PMU Subsystem				
PMU			SW	
UART0			NSW	R/W
UART1			SW	R/W
CRF_APB			SW	R/W
DDR_XMPU0_CFG			SW	R/W
DDR_XMPU1_CFG			SW	R/W
DDR_XMPU2_CFG			SW	R/W
DDR_XMPU3_CFG			SW	R/W
DDR_XMPU4_CFG			SW	R/W

Table 1: System Address Map (Cont'd)

DDR_XMPU5_CFG			SW	R/W
FPD_SLCR			SW	R/W
FPD_XMPU_CFG			SW	R/W
LPD_XPPU			SW	R/W
CRL_APB			SW	R/W
EFUSE			SW	R/W
IOU_SLCR			SW	R/W
LPD_SLCR			SW	R/W
OCM_XMPU_CFG			SW	R/W
RPU			SW	R/W

For secure and safe systems using XMPU and XPPU for isolation, it is desirable to protect their configuration to prevent errant software or an adversary from modifying these settings and compromising the intended isolation. This can be done with either of the following:

- The `psu_protection_lock` function in the PMU Firmware can be called.
- The XMPU lock bit can be set.
- The FPD_XMPU protection can be used.

Since the XPPU cannot be locked as referenced in [XPPU Configuration Locking](#) section, it is best, as demonstrated in the reference design, to add the XPPU configuration registers to a secure master, such as the PMU.

Building The Hardware Platform

Isolation in the UltraScale+ MPSoC family is rooted in hardware. As such, the configuration of the hardware is the first step in building the isolated system. The following steps outline how to set up the hardware to create three isolated subsystems and use the XPMU, XPPU, and TrustZone hardware to isolate each subsystem. The first step is to create the base hardware platform to build upon.

After starting the Vivado tools, click **Create Project** in the Quick Start page to open the New Project wizard. Use the information below to make selections in each of the wizard screens:

- Create a New Vivado Project

No options. Select **Next**.

- Project Name

Project name: **ps_isolation_lab**

Project location: **c:/temp/xapp1320_2021.1/** (referred to later as **<your lab location>**)

Create project subdirectory: **checked**

Select **Next**.

- Project Type

Check **Example Project**.

- Select Project Template

Select **Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Design Presets**, and then select **Next**.

- Default board or part

Select **Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102 Evaluation Board**, and then select **Next**.

- Select Design Preset

Check **Processing System and Programmable Logic (PS+PL) with GPIO and Block RAM**, and then select **Next**.

- New Project Summary

No options. Select **Finish**.

Afterwards, your diagram will look like [Figure 14](#).




Figure 14: Initial IP Integrator Diagram

Now that a base hardware platform has been generated it is necessary to refine that definition for isolation.

1. Double-click the **Zynq UltraScale+ IP** (`zynq_ultra_ps_e_0` instance).

2. Check **Switch To Advanced Mode** in the Page Navigator of the new pop-up window.
3. Select **Isolation Configuration** in the Page Navigator.
4. Check **Enable Isolation** at the top of the Isolation Configuration page.

The Secure Subsystem is a baseline subsystem for secure booting. The tools create this system as a baseline for you to start with. For ease of documentation, this reference design builds its own system. However, you can start with the Secure Subsystem to save time.

Note: It is not currently possible to change the name of the pre-built Secure Subsystem.

5. Delete the Secure Subsystem by selecting it, right-clicking and selecting **Delete** from the drop-down menu.
6. Create two additional isolation subsystems (RPU and APU):
 - a. Click the **+** button to **Add New Subsystem**. Type add **RPU** and press **Enter**.
 - b. Click the **+** button to **Add New Subsystem**. Type add **APU** and press **Enter**.

When complete, your window should look like [Figure 15](#).



IMPORTANT: Do not select **OK** yet. There are more steps that have to be completed before that.




Figure 15: Re-customize IP Window: Base Isolation Subsystems

Before customizing the isolation systems, it is important to understand the three check boxes shown in [Figure 15](#) as they have significant ramifications for isolated systems:

Enable Isolation

This is the key enabling function for isolation. You must check this for enabling an isolation setup in the reference design.

Enable Secure Debug

Checking Enable Secure Debug adds the DAP and CoreSight components as masters in all subsystems. This can also be achieved in each subsystem by adding one or both as masters to that subsystem. This option does not actually add the components into your system. This reference design keeps this option checked by default as it is expected to be used as a training guide for using isolation and debug. For fielded systems, however, care must be taken on the use of debug logic and debug access points. It is recommended that such components be under the control of the most secure (trusted) subsystem in your design.

Lock Unused Memory

Checking [Enable Secure Debug](#) adds the DAP and CoreSight components as masters in all the subsystems. This can also be achieved in each subsystem by adding one or both as masters to that subsystem. This option does not actually add the components into your system. However, be mindful that there are operations in a system that are not always obvious to you and could be impacted by this parameter. For example, when loading authenticated and/or encrypted images after boot (a partial bitfile), the system must access the CSU, eFuse, and potentially BBRAM register space. If these are not explicitly added to the secure subsystem performing this action, then it is blocked by the setting of the Lock Unused Memory option. Use of this option for this reference design is not tested and is therefore assumed to be unchecked.

It is now necessary to add masters to each isolation subsystem.

1. Right-click **APU**, select **Add Master**, and search/select **APU**.
2. Right-click **RPU**, select **Add Master** and search/select **RPU0**.
 - Accept the default **secure** setting.

Now that each subsystem has a master, it is necessary to assign the slave components to the APU subsystem.

1. Add slave peripherals to the APU subsystem:
 - a. Right-click **APU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **GPIO** keeping **NonSecure** TZ setting.
Note: This is shared with the RPU subsystem.
 - b. Right-click **APU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **SWDT0** keeping **NonSecure** TZ setting.
 - c. Right-click **APU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **TTC0** keeping **NonSecure** TZ setting.
 - d. Right-click **APU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **UART0** keeping **NonSecure** TZ setting.
2. Add slave memory to the APU subsystem:
 - a. Right-click **APU** to **Add Slave** and search/select **OCM**:
 - Start address: **0xFFFF0000**
 - Size: **64 KB**
 - TZ settings: **NonSecure**

Note: This is shared with the RPU subsystem.

- b. Right-click **APU** to **Add Slave** and search/select **DDR_LOW**:
 - Start address: **0x0**
 - Size: **32 MB**
 - TZ settings: **NonSecure**
- c. Right-click **APU** to **Add Slave** and search/select **DDR_LOW**:
 - Start address: **0x60000000**
 - Size: **1 MB**
 - TZ settings: **NonSecure**

Note: This is shared with the RPU subsystem.

With the APU subsystem fully populated it is now necessary to assign the slave components to the RPU subsystem.

Note: When building this subsystem some resources might appear in red when initially added. This is due to a temporary security conflict which gets resolved when the subsystem is fully defined. There should be no conflicts (no red) when completed.

1. Add slave peripherals to the RPU subsystem:
 - a. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **GPIO** keeping **NonSecure** TZ setting.
Note: This is shared with the APU subsystem.
 - b. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **I2C1** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
 - c. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **SWDT1** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
 - d. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **TTC1** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
 - e. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **UART1** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
2. Add slave registers to the RPU subsystem (Necessary because FSBL executes on RPU):
 - a. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **CRF_APB** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
 - b. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **CRL_APB** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
 - c. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **EFUSE** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
 - d. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **IOU_SLCR** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
 - e. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **RPU** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
3. Add slave memory to the RPU subsystem:
 - a. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slave** and search/select **OCM**:
 - Start address: **0xFFFC0000**
 - Size: **192 KB**
 - TZ settings: **Secure**
 - b. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slave** and search/select **OCM**:
 - Start address: **0xFFFF0000**

- Size: **64 KB**
 - TZ settings: **NonSecure**
- Note:** This is shared with the APU subsystem.
- c. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slave** and search/select **DDR_LOW**:
 - Start address: **0x40000000**
 - Size: **16 MB**
 - TZ settings: **Secure**
 - d. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slave** and search/select **DDR_LOW**:
 - Start address: **0x60000000**
 - Size: **1 MB**
 - TZ settings: **NonSecure**
 - e. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slave** and search/select **R5_0_ATCM_GLOBAL**:
 - Start address: **<default>**
 - Size: **<default>**
 - TZ settings: **Secure**

At this stage the APU and RPU subsystems have been fully populated. However, the PMU subsystem needs a few modifications in order for the error messaging to reach the outside world.

1. Add slave peripherals to the PMU Firmware subsystem:
 - a. Right-click **PMU Firmware** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **UART0** keeping **NonSecure** TZ setting.

Note: This is shared with the APU subsystem.
 - b. Right-click **PMU Firmware** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **UART1** keeping **Secure** TZ setting.

Note: This is shared with the RPU subsystem.

2. The Isolation Configuration window should look like [Figure 16](#), [Figure 17](#), and [Figure 18](#).




Figure 16: Re-customize IP Window: APU

Isolation Configuration [Video Demo](#)

Please review **Known Limitations** under the **Isolation Configuration** Section of **PG201**.

Enable Isolation
 Enable Secure Debug
 Lock Unused Memory

← 🔍 ⏏ ⏏ + - 📄

Search:

Name	Start Address	Size	Unit	TZ Settings	Access Setti...	End Address	Type
> APU							
v PMU Firmware							
v Masters							
PMU							
v Slaves							
v Peripherals							
UART0	0xFF000000	64	k	NonSecure	Read/Write	0xFF00FFFF	LPD
UART1	0xFF010000	64	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFF01FFFF	LPD
v Control and Status Registers							
CRF_APB	0xFD1A0000	1280	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFD2DFFFF	FPD
DDR_XMPU0...	0xFD000000	64	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFD00FFFF	FPD
DDR_XMPU1...	0xFD010000	64	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFD01FFFF	FPD
DDR_XMPU2...	0xFD020000	64	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFD02FFFF	FPD
DDR_XMPU3...	0xFD030000	64	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFD03FFFF	FPD
DDR_XMPU4...	0xFD040000	64	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFD04FFFF	FPD
DDR_XMPU5...	0xFD050000	64	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFD05FFFF	FPD
FPD_SLCR	0xFD610000	512	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFD68FFFF	FPD
FPD_XMPU_...	0xFD5D0000	64	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFD5DFFFF	FPD
LPD_XPPU	0xFF980000	64	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFF98FFFF	LPD
CRL_APB	0xFF5E0000	2560	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFF85FFFF	LPD
EFUSE	0xFFCC0000	64	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFFCCFFFF	LPD
IOU_SLCR	0xFF180000	768	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFF23FFFF	LPD
LPD_SLCR	0xFF410000	640	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFF4AFFFF	LPD
OCM_XMPU_...	0xFFA70000	64	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFFA7FFFF	LPD
RPU	0xFF9A0000	64	k	Secure	Read/Write	0xFF9AFFFF	LPD
> RPU							

Figure 17: Re-customize IP Window: PMU Firmware




Figure 18: Re-customize IP Window: RPU

3. Select **OK**.

The Vivado tools automatically generated the address map for the AXI IP in the sample design. However, because we have now changed the platform due to isolation restrictions, it is necessary to re-map that IP.

1. In the Address Editor tab of the Block Design window, simultaneously select both **axi_bram_ctrl_0** and **axi_gpio_0** segments.
 - a. Right-click and select **Unassign**.
2. In the Address Editor, select the **Data** segment.
 - a. Right-click and select **Assign All** and then select **OK**.

Note: The PL peripherals **axi_bram_ctrl_0** and **axi_gpio_0** do not support the protection mechanism and are accessible by all AXI masters.

Now that a platform design has been created, it is necessary to implement the design to generate all the necessary hardware files for Vitis.

1. In the Flow Navigator window, click **Generate Bitstream** and select **Yes**.
 - a. Click **Save** if requested.

2. Click **OK** in the Launch Runs popup window.
 - a. This process takes several minutes depending on the capability of the machine it is running on.
3. Click **Cancel** in the Bitstream Generation Completed popup window. It is not necessary to open the implemented design.

It is now necessary to export the newly created hardware platform and launch Vitis.

1. Select **File > Export > Export Hardware** to export the hardware platform.
2. Export Hardware Platform
 - Select **Next**.
3. Output
 - Check **Include bitstream**.
 - Select **Next**.
4. Files
 - XSA file name: `xapp1320_zcu102_hw`
 - Export to: `<your lab location>/ps_isolation_lab/hardwarePlatform/`
 - Select **Next**.
5. Exporting Hardware Platform
 - No options. Select **Finish**.
6. Export Hardware Platform
 - Select **Next**.
7. Select **Tools > Launch Vitis IDE**.
 - a. Vitis IDE Launcher: change workspace to `<your lab location>/softwareDevelopment`
 - b. Select **Launch**.

Creating Demonstration Software

This section describes how to use Vitis to create software that runs on the isolated system created in the previous section. To test the features previously discussed, five software applications will be created. These applications and their functions are listed in [Table 2](#).

Table 2: Software Applications

Application Project	Function
zynqmp_pmufw	PMU firmware: event handler
zynqmp_fsbl	FSBL running on R5_0
rpu-ipi	Interprocessor interrupt code running on the R5_0
rpu-fi	Fault injection code running on the R5_0
apu-ipi	Interprocessor interrupt code running on APU_0
apu-fi	Fault injection code running on the APU_0

Because this lab runs multiple applications simultaneously, it is necessary to manually modify the linker scripts for each project. Failure to do so would result in memory collisions. For the purposes of this lab, however, the linker scripts will be imported along with the code (excluding FSBL and PMU projects where the defaults are acceptable).

Creating a Platform Project (With Boot Components)

This lab will create a Platform Project in which to host the six applications summarized in Table 2. The boot components (**zynqmp_fsbl** and **zynqmp_pmufw**) will be created at the same time as the creation of the Platform Project. The remaining four user applications will be created separately as Application Projects immediately following the creation of the Platform Project.

1. Select **File > New > Platform Project**.

Create new platform project

- a. Platform project name: **xapp1320_zcu102**

2. Select **Next**.

Platform (Create a new platform from hardware (XSA) tab)

- a. Hardware Specification

XSA File: **<your lab location>/ps_isolation_lab/hardwarePlatform/xapp1320_zcu102_hw.xsa**

This is the file created and exported by Vivado.

- b. Software Specification

Operating System: **standalone**

Processor: **psu_cortexr5_0**

- c. Boot Components

Check **Generate boot components**.

Check `psu_cortexr5_0`.

3. Select **Finish**.

The previous step created a platform project with the FSBL and PMU Firmware applications. However, a few customizations are desired for demonstrating the isolation features in this lab.

Because the PMU owns the protection units and will be the primary system level error handler, it is necessary to add four build variables:

- `ENABLE_EM`: Enables the error manager of the PMU
- `ENABLE_SCHEDULER`: Prerequisite for use of `ENABLE_EM`

Note: See the PMU Firmware Build Flags table in Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Software Developer Guide (UG1137) [Ref 4]).

- `XPU_INTR_DEBUG_PRINT_ENABLE`: Enhanced debug print information
- `XPFW_DEBUG_DETAILED`: Enhanced debug print information

Note: These variables are not necessary in a fielded system. They are only necessary for external messaging and adding more detail to that messaging. In a fielded system, they would not normally be set.

4. In the Explorer tab, right-click the `zynqmp_pmufw` folder and select **C/C++ Build Settings**.

Extra compiler flags: To the end of the field, append the following

```
-DFSBL_DEBUG_DETAILED -DENABLE_SCHEDULER -DXPU_INTR_DEBUG_PRINT_ENABLE
-DXPFW_DEBUG_DETAILED
```

5. Select **OK**.

For details see [Figure 19](#).




Figure 19: Configure Build Settings

6. [Optional] In the Explorer tab, right-click the `zynqmp_fsbl` folder and select **C/C++ Build Settings**.

Extra compiler flags: To the end of the field, append the following:

```
-DFSBL_DEBUG_DETAILED
```

Note: This just enables all debug messages from the FSBL during boot. It will not be used for the demonstration of this lab or in its captured images.

7. Select **OK**.

Now it is necessary to add two domains for the software to run in. Two domains will be created: one for the R5-0 applications and one for the A53-0 applications.

1. Select the + symbol in the **xapp1320_zcu102** tab.

- a. Domain

Name: **domain_psu_cortexr5_0**

Display Name: **domain_psu_cortexr5_0**

OS (accept default): **standalone**

Version: **<cannot be changed>**

Processor: select **psu_cortexr5_0** from the pulldown

Support Runtimes: (accept default): **C/C++**

Architecture (accept default): **32-bit**

2. Select **OK**.

3. Select the + symbol in the **xapp1320_zcu102** tab.

- a. Domain

Name: **domain_psu_cortexa53_0**

Display Name: **domain_psu_cortexa53_0**

OS (accept default): **standalone**

Version: **<cannot be changed>**

Processor: select **psu_cortexa53_0** from the pulldown

Support Runtimes: (accept default): **C/C++**

Architecture (accept default): **64-bit**

4. Select **OK**.

Now that the base platform project has been created, it is time to start adding System Projects to it, each with their own Application Projects. This lab will create two systems (FI_SYSTEM and IPI_SYSTEM) to host their respective Application Projects.

Creating the APU Fault Injection Software Application Project

In applications that are safe, secure, or both, it is not sufficient to set up an isolation system and assume it will behave as expected. As such, it is necessary to physically test it with running software. While verification using a debug mode (such as JTAG boot) is useful to bring up the initial system, it is not sufficient to fully verify or validate the system. Thus, an application has been created as a base template to demonstrate the ability to prevent illegal reads and writes

by the APU subsystem to various memories and peripherals. In a real system, this test would likely be much more exhaustive in its coverage.

Because the actual source code is delivered with this lab, it is necessary to create an empty project in which the code will be imported.

1. Select **File > New > Application Project**.

Create New Application Project

2. Select **Next**.

Platform (Select a platform from repository tab)

- a. Hardware Specification

Nothing should be changed here

3. Select **Next**.

Application project details

- a. Application project name: **apu-fi**
- b. Select a system project: **+Create new...**
- c. System project name: **FI_SYSTEM**
- d. Target processor: **psu_cortexa53_0**

4. Select **Next**.

Domain

- a. Select a domain: **domain_psu_cortexa53_0**

5. Select **Next**.

Templates

- a. Available Templates: **Empty Application(C)**

Note: Do not choose the version for C++

Note: The code will be populated in the next steps

6. Select **Finish**.

7. Right-click the **src** folder under the **FI_SYSTEM/apu-fi** folder in the Explorer tab, and select **Import Sources**.

File system

- a. From directory: **<your lab location>/software/c/faultInjectionTest/apu**

8. Check **apu** and then select **Finish**.

9. Select **Yes To All** when asked to overwrite.

Creating the RPU Fault Injection Software Application Project

In applications that are safe, secure, or both, it is not sufficient to set up an isolation system and assume it will behave as expected. As such, it is necessary to physically test it with running software. While verification using a debug mode (such as JTAG boot) is useful to bring up the initial system, it is not sufficient to fully verify or validate the system. Thus, an application has been created as a base template to demonstrate the ability to prevent illegal reads and writes by the RPU subsystem to various memories and peripherals. In a real system, this test would likely be much more exhaustive in its coverage.

Because the actual source code is delivered with this lab, it is necessary to create an empty project in which the code will be imported.

1. Select **File > New > Application Project**.

Create New Application Project

2. Select **Next**.

- a. Platform (Select a platform from repository tab)
- b. Hardware Specification

Nothing should be changed here

3. Select **Next**.

Application project details:

- a. Application project name: **rpu-fi**
- b. Select a system project: **FI_SYSTEM**
- c. System project name: **FI_SYSTEM** (greyed out due to above selection)
- d. Target processor: **psu_cortexr5_0**

4. Select **Next**.

Domain:

- a. Select a domain: **domain_psu_cortexr5_0**

5. Select **Next**.

Templates:

- a. Available Templates: **Empty Application(C)**

Note: Do not choose the version for C++.

Note: The code will be populated in the next steps.

6. Select **Finish**.

7. Right-click the **src** folder under **FI_SYSTEM/rpu-fi** folder in the Explorer tab and select **Import Sources**.

File system:

- a. From the directory: `<your lab location>/software/c/ faultInjectionTest /rpu`
8. Check **rpu** and then select **Finish**.
9. Select **Yes To All** when asked to overwrite.

Creating the APU IPI Software Application Project

In an isolated system, there is still a need for one subsystem to communicate with another subsystem. One method to do this safely and securely is to utilize the IPI system. This is demonstrated using two projects: the first runs in the APU subsystem, while the second one runs in the RPU subsystem. This project targets the APU subsystem.

Because the actual source code is delivered with this lab, it is necessary to create an empty application in which the code will be imported.

1. Select **File > New > Application Project**.

Create New Application Project

2. Select **Next**.

Platform (Select a platform from repository tab)

- a. Hardware Specification

Nothing should be changed here

3. Select **Next**.

Application project Details:

- a. Application project name: **apu-ipi**
- b. Select a system project: **+Create new...**
- c. System project name: **IPI_SYSTEM**
- d. Target processor: **psu_cortexa53_0**

4. Select **Next**.

Domain

- a. Select a domain: **domain_psu_cortexa53_0**

5. Select **Next**.

Templates

- a. Available Templates: **Empty Application(C)**

Note: Do not choose the version for C++.

Note: The code will be populated in the next steps.

6. Select **Finish**.
7. Right-click the **src** folder under **IPI_SYSTEM/apu-ipi** folder in the Explorer tab and select **Import Sources**.

File system:

- a. From directory: `<your lab location>/software/c/ipiTest/apu`
8. Check **apu** and then select **Finish**.
9. Select **Yes To All** when asked to overwrite.

Creating the RPU IPI Software Application Project

In an isolated system there is still a need for one subsystem to communicate with another subsystem. One method to do this safely and securely is to utilize the IPI system. This is demonstrated using two projects: the first runs in the APU subsystem, while the second runs in the RPU subsystem. This project targets the RPU subsystem.

Because the actual source code is delivered with this lab, it is necessary to create an empty project in which the code will be imported.

1. Select **File > New > Application Project**.

Create New Application Project

2. Select **Next**.

Platform (Select a platform from repository tab)

- a. Hardware Specification

Nothing should be changed here.

3. Select **Next**.

Application project Details:

- a. Application project name: **rpu-ipi**
- b. Select a system project: **IPI_SYSTEM**
- c. System project name: **IPI_SYSTEM** (greyed out due to above selection)
- d. Target processor : **psu_cortexr5_0**

4. Select **Next**.

Domain

- a. Select a domain: **domain_psu_cortexr5_0**

5. Select **Next**.

Templates

- a. Available Templates: **Empty Application(C)**

Note: Do not choose the version for C++.

Note: The code will be populated in the next steps.

6. Select **Finish**.
7. Right-click the **src** folder under the **FI_SYSTEM/rpu-ipi** folder in the Explorer tab and select **Import Sources**.

File system

- a. From the directory: `<your lab location>/software/c/ipiTest/rpu`
8. Check **rpu** and then select **Finish**.
9. Select **Yes To All** when asked to overwrite.

Running the Applications

Now that the hardware platform and associated software applications have been built, it is time to generate the boot images and run the demonstration software.

1. Select **Project > Clean**.
2. Select **Clean all projects, Start a build immediately, and Build the entire workspace** check boxes.
3. Click **Clean** and wait for it to complete before proceeding to the next steps.

Inter-processor Interrupts

The applications that test IPI functions were built to demonstrate one method for two isolated subsystems to communicate with each other without the introduction of interference between the two systems. This build will have software running simultaneously on both the APU and RPU processors. Each application has two key functions:

- Send a message to the other subsystem
- Output the message received from the other subsystem

To build this system, a BIF file will have to be created with five partitions:

- **zynqmp_fsbl**: Sets up device isolation and loads all other partitions.
- **zynqmp_pmufw**: Error handler and messenger.
- **xapp1320_zcu102_hw**: (PL Bitstream): No real function in this system.
- **apu-ipi**: Application running on A53_0 that sends and receives messages to the RPU subsystem.

- **rpu_ipi**: Application running on R5_0 that sends and receives messages to the APU subsystem.

Note: For the following steps, `<build path> = <your lab location>/ps_isolation_lab/softwareDevelopment`.

Note: For the following steps, all options not stated should be kept at default value.

1. Select **Xilinx > Create Boot Image > Zynq and Zynq Ultrascale**.
 - a. Architecture: **Zynq MP**
 - b. Check **Create new BIF file**
 - c. Output BIF file path: `<build path>/ipi.bif`
 - d. Output path: `<build path>/BOOT.bin`
 - e. Continue to next steps *without* clicking **Create Image**.
2. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/xapp1320_zcu102/export/xapp1320_zcu102/sw/xapp1320_zcu102/boot/fsbl.elf`
 - b. Partition Type: **bootloader**
 - c. Destination Device: **PS**
 - d. Destination CPU: **R5 0**
3. Click **OK**.
4. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/xapp1320_zcu102/export/xapp1320_zcu102/sw/xapp1320_zcu102/boot/pmufw.elf`
 - b. Partition Type: **datafile**
 - Optional: This could be *pmu (loaded by bootrom)*.
 - c. Destination Device: **PS**
 - d. Destination CPU: **PMU**
5. Click **OK**.
6. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/xapp1320_zcu102/hw/xapp1320_zcu102.bit`
 - b. Partition Type: **datafile**
 - c. Destination Device: **PL**
7. Click **OK**.
8. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/apu-ipi/Debug/apu-ipi.elf`

- b. Partition Type: **datafile**
 - c. Destination Device: **PS**
 - d. Destination CPU: **A53 0**
 - e. Exception Level: **EL0**
 - f. Check **Enable Trust Zone**
9. Click **OK**.
 10. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/rpu-ipi/Debug/rpu-ipi.elf`
 - b. Partition Type: **datafile**
 - c. Destination Device: **PS**
 - d. Destination CPU: **R5 0**
 11. The Create Boot Image window will look like [Figure 20](#).
 12. Click **Create Image**.





Figure 20: IPI System BIF Setup

Now that you created a `BOOT.bin`, it can be copied to an SD card to be used to boot the development board.

1. Copy `<build path>/BOOT.bin` to an SD card.
2. Connect a USB-UART cable to the UART port of the board and identify the COM ports that were mapped to it.
3. Set up two serial communication terminals to observe output on UART0 (APU) and UART1 (RPU).


- a. Baud rate: 115200
 - b. Data bits: 8
 - c. Parity: None
 - d. Stop bits: 1
4. Set Boot Mode: SD (see [Figure 21](#)).
 - a. $\text{MODE}[3:0] > 1110 > \text{ON-ON-ON-OFF}$
 5. Insert SD card.
 6. Power up the board.



X22382-070821

Figure 21: ZCU102 Board Setup

Figure 22 shows the IPI system output.



```

RPU IPI! [Build: Mar 5 2021 21:21:19]
RPU Message Content:
W0: 0x00000258
W1: 0x00000259
W2: 0x0000025A
W3: 0x0000025B
W4: 0x0000025C
W5: 0x0000025D
W6: 0x0000025E
W7: 0x0000025F
Setting Up Interrupt ID: 65

---RPU Message to APU Sent--->

---RPU Message to APU Received---

-----Enter Interrupt Handler
Message Received From APU:
RPU W0 Expected -> 0x00000064 :Received 0x00000064
RPU W1 Expected -> 0x00000065 :Received 0x00000065
RPU W2 Expected -> 0x00000066 :Received 0x00000066
RPU W3 Expected -> 0x00000067 :Received 0x00000067
RPU W4 Expected -> 0x00000068 :Received 0x00000068
RPU W5 Expected -> 0x00000069 :Received 0x00000069
RPU W6 Expected -> 0x0000006A :Received 0x0000006A
RPU W7 Expected -> 0x0000006B :Received 0x0000006B
-----Exit Interrupt Handler

APU IPI! [Build: Mar 5 2021 21:21:14]
APU Message Content:
W0: 0x00000064
W1: 0x00000065
W2: 0x00000066
W3: 0x00000067
W4: 0x00000068
W5: 0x00000069
W6: 0x0000006A
W7: 0x0000006B
Setting Up Interrupt ID: 67

-----Enter Interrupt Handler
Message Received from RPU:
APU W0 Expected -> 0x00000258 :Received 0x00000258
APU W1 Expected -> 0x00000259 :Received 0x00000259
APU W2 Expected -> 0x0000025A :Received 0x0000025A
APU W3 Expected -> 0x0000025B :Received 0x0000025B
APU W4 Expected -> 0x0000025C :Received 0x0000025C
APU W5 Expected -> 0x0000025D :Received 0x0000025D
APU W6 Expected -> 0x0000025E :Received 0x0000025E
APU W7 Expected -> 0x0000025F :Received 0x0000025F
-----Exit Interrupt Handler

<---APU Message to RPU Sent---

---APU Message to RPU Received---

```

Figure 22: IPI System Output

APU Fault Injection

For each demonstration, the fault injection is divided into two systems: APU and RPU. The first system built is the APU. Its function is to:


- Read and write non-secure regions of memory in its own domain.
- Read and write non-secure regions of memory outside its own domain.
- Read and write secure regions of memory (these are, by definition, outside of its domain).
- Read and write undefined regions of memory:
 - This is allowed in this lab but such regions can be excluded if desired when setting up the isolated subsystems, using the check box **Lock Unused Memory** in the Isolation Configuration dialog.
- Read non-secure peripherals in its own domain:
 - Writes have been intentionally skipped to prevent undesired consequences of blindly writing to a peripheral.
- Read secure peripherals (these are, by definition, outside of its own domain):
 - Writes have been intentionally skipped to prevent undesired consequences of blindly writing to a peripheral.

To build this system, a BIF file will have to be created with four partitions:

- **zynqmp_fsbl**: Sets up device isolation and loads all other partitions.
- **zynqmp_pmufw**: Error handler and messenger.
- **mpsoc_preset_wrapper** (PL Bitstream): No real function in this system.
- **apu-fi**: Application running on A53_0 that reads and writes to various memories and peripherals of the system.
- **rpu-ipi**: Application running on R5_0 that reads and writes to various memories and peripherals of the system.

To prevent a collision of messages between the FSBL, PMU, and the application, it is necessary to modify the UART that the PMU will use. Recall that it was given both UART0 and UART1. Because the APU must output on UART0, the PMU UART must be changed to UART1.

1. In the xapp1320_zcu102 tab, click **Board Support Package** (under psu_pmu_0/zynqmp_pmufw) and then click **Modify BSP Settings**
2. Select **standalone**.
3. Change the values for stdin and stdout to psu_uart_1 by clicking in that field and selecting **psu_uart_1** from the pull-down menu (see [Figure 23](#)).
4. Select **OK**.



X22785-042519

Figure 23: Board Support Package Settings

5. Select the xapp1320_zcu102 project in the Explorer Tab and then select from the top menu: **Project > Build Project** and wait for it to complete.

Note: For the following steps, <build path> = <your lab location>/ps_isolation_lab/softwareDevelopment.

Note: For the following steps, all options not stated should be kept at default value.

1. Select **Xilinx > Create Boot Image**.
 - a. Architecture: **Zynq MP**
 - b. Check **Create new BIF file**

- c. Output BIF file path: `<build path>/apu-fi.bif`
- d. Output path: `<build path>/BOOT.bin`
- e. Continue to next steps *without* clicking **Create Image**.
2. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/xapp1320_zcu102/export/xapp1320_zcu102/sw/xapp1320_zcu102_boot/fsbl.elf`
 - b. Partition Type: **bootloader**
 - c. Destination Device: **PS**
 - d. Destination CPU: **R5 0**
3. Click **OK**.
4. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/xapp1320_zcu102/export/xapp1320_zcu102/sw/xapp1320_zcu102_boot/pmufw.elf`
 - b. Partition Type: **datafile**
 - Optional: This could be *pmu (loaded by bootrom)*.
 - c. Destination Device: **PS**
 - d. Destination CPU: **PMU**
5. Click **OK**.
6. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/xapp1320_zcu102/hw/xapp1320_zcu102.bit`
 - b. Partition Type: **datafile**
 - c. Destination Device: **PL**
7. Click **OK**.
8. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/apu-fi/Debug/apu-fi.elf`
 - b. Partition Type: **datafile**
 - c. Destination Device: **PS**
 - d. Destination CPU: **A53 0**
 - e. Exception Level: **EL0**
 - f. Check **Enable Trust Zone**
9. Click **OK**.
10. The Create Boot Image window looks like [Figure 24](#).

11. Click **Create Image**. If asked to overwrite the previously created BIF/BIN file, select **OK**.





Figure 24: APU Fault Injection System BIF Setup

Now that you created a `BOOT.bin`, it can be copied to an SD card to be used to boot the development board.

1. Copy `<build path>/BOOT.bin` to an SD card.
2. Set up two serial communication terminals to observe output on UART0 (APU) and UART1 (PMU).
 - a. Baud rate: 115200
 - b. Data bits: 8
 - c. Parity: None
 - d. Stop bits: 1
3. Set Boot Mode: SD (see [Figure 21](#)).
 - a. `MODE[3:0] > 1110 > ON-ON-ON-OFF`
4. Insert SD card.
5. Power up the board.

Figure 25 shows the APU fault injection system output.



```

CP2108 Quad USB to UART Bridge Controller (Port 4) — 113x84 — 115200.8.N.1
EM: XMPU Master ID access violation
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0xFF110000
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: RPU0
EM: Poison register : 0xFF9C0
-----
---Starting Fault Injection Test (Running on the APU)---

(S)=Secure, (NS)=Non-Secure, (ND)=Not-Defined
Memories
RPU_OCM_S_BASE      : OCM Secure Memory Base Address in RPU Sub-System
RPU_OCM_NS_SHARED_BASE : OCM Non-Secure Memory Base Address in both RPU and APU Sub-Systems
RPU_ATCM_S_BASE     : R5 TCM Bank A Secure Memory Base Address in RPU Sub-System
RPU_DDR_LOW_S_BASE  : DDR Secure Memory Base Address in RPU Sub-System
RPU_DDR_LOW_NS_SHARED_BASE : DDR Non-Secure Memory Base Address in both RPU and APU Sub-Systems
RPU_OCM_NS_SHARED_BASE : OCM Non-Secure Memory Base Address in both APU and RPU Sub-Systems
APU_DDR_LOW_NS_BASE : DDR Non-Secure Memory Base Address in APU Sub-System
APU_DDR_LOW_NS_SHARED_BASE : DDR Non-Secure Memory Base Address in both APU and RPU Sub-Systems
UNDEFINED_DDR_MEMORY_BASE : Memory Base Address Not Defined in Any Sub-System

Peripherals
APU_UART0_NS_START : Non-Secure UART0 in APU Sub-System
APU_SWDT0_NS_START : Non-Secure UART0 in APU Sub-System
APU_TTC0_NS_START  : Non-Secure UART0 in APU Sub-System
APU_UART0_NS_START : Non-Secure UART0 in APU Sub-System
SHARED_GPIO_NS_START : Shared Non-Secure GPIO
RPU_UART1_S_START  : Secure UART1 in RPU Sub-System
RPU_SWDT1_S_START  : Secure SWDT1 in RPU Sub-System
RPU_TTC1_S_START   : Secure TTC1 in RPU Sub-System
RPU_I2C1_S_START   : Secure I2C1 in RPU Sub-System

Read/Write Of Various Memories

Read/Write of RPU(S) Memory
  Reading RPU_OCM_S_BASE      ... FAILED!
  Writing RPU_OCM_S_BASE     ... FAILED!
  Reading RPU_DDR_LOW_S_BASE  ... FAILED!
  Writing RPU_DDR_LOW_S_BASE ... FAILED!
  Reading RPU_ATCM_S_BASE    ... FAILED!
  Writing RPU_ATCM_S_BASE    ... FAILED!

Read/Write of RPU(NS) Memory
  Reading RPU_OCM_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!
  Writing RPU_OCM_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!
  Reading RPU_DDR_LOW_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!
  Writing RPU_DDR_LOW_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!

Read/Write of APU(S) Memory
  ---This combination does not exist
  ---APU has no (S)secure memory

Read/Write of APU(NS)
  Reading APU_OCM_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!
  Writing APU_OCM_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!
  Reading APU_DDR_LOW_NS_BASE ... PASS!
  Writing APU_DDR_LOW_NS_BASE ... Skipped to avoid memory collision!
  Reading APU_DDR_LOW_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!
  Writing APU_DDR_LOW_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!

Read/Write of Undefined (ND) Memory
  Reading UNDEFINED_DDR_MEMORY_BASE ... PASS!
  Writing UNDEFINED_DDR_MEMORY_BASE ... PASS!

Reading Sub-System Peripherals

APU Peripherals
  Reading APU_UART0_NS_START ... PASS!
  Reading APU_SWDT0_NS_START ... PASS!
  Reading APU_TTC0_NS_START  ... PASS!

RPU Peripherals
  Reading RPU_UART1_S_START  ... FAILED!
  Reading RPU_SWDT1_S_START  ... FAILED!
  Reading RPU_TTC1_S_START   ... FAILED!
  Reading RPU_I2C1_S_START   ... FAILED!

Shared Peripherals
  Reading SHARED_GPIO_NS_START ... PASS!

-----
---Fault Injection Test Complete---
  
```

```

CP2108 Quad USB to UART Bridge Controller (Part 1) — 67x84 — 1...
PMU Firmware 2020.3 Feb 16 2021 17:34:01
PMU_ROM Version: xgbr-v8.1.0-0
EM: Enabling XMPU/XPPU interrupts
EM Module (MOD-0): Initialized.
DAP_WAKE (MOD-3): Initialized.
LEGACY_PWR_UP/DN/ISO (MOD-4): Initialized.
XPFW: Calling ROM_PWRUP_Handler..Done
XPFW: Calling ROM_Isolation_Handler..Done
XPFW: Calling ROM_PWRUP_Handler..Done
XPFW: Calling ROM_PWRUP_Handler..Done
FSBL is running on RPU.
Warning: APU-only restart is not supported if FSBL boots on RPU.
XPFW_SchedulerRemoveTask: Removed 1 tasks
-----
EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XMPU OCM Read permission violation occurred
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0xFFFF00XX
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: APU
EM: Poison register: 0x100000
-----
EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XMPU OCM Write permission violation occurred
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0xFFFF00XX
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: APU
EM: Poison register: 0x100000
-----
EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XMPU DDR1 Read permission violation occurred
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0x400000XX
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: APU
EM: Poison register: 0x100000
-----
EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XMPU DDR1 Write permission violation occurred
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0x400000XX
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: APU
EM: Poison register: 0x100000
-----
EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XMPU Master ID access violation
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0xFFE00000
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: APU
EM: Poison register : 0xFF9C0
-----
EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XMPU Master ID access violation
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0xFFE00000
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: APU
EM: Poison register : 0xFF9C0
-----
EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XMPU Master ID access violation
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0xFF010000
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: APU
EM: Poison register : 0xFF9C0
-----
EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XMPU FPD Read permission violation occurred
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0xFD4000XX
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: APU
EM: Poison register: 0xFD4F0
-----
EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XMPU Master ID access violation
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0xFF120000
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: APU
EM: Poison register : 0xFF9C0
-----
EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XMPU Master ID access violation
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0xFF030000
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: APU
EM: Poison register : 0xFF9C0
  
```

Figure 25: APU Fault Injection System Output

Note: In Figure 25, the PMU error messages correspond to each **Failed** attempt of the APU system to access a restricted address.

RPU Fault Injection

For each demonstration, the fault injection is divided into two systems: APU and RPU. The first system built was the APU. This section describes how to build the RPU system, whose function is to:

- Read and write non-secure regions of memory in its own domain.
- Read and write non-secure regions of memory outside its own domain.

- Read and write secure regions of memory.
- Read and write undefined regions of memory:
 - This is allowed in this lab but such regions can be excluded if desired when setting up the isolated subsystems.
- Read non-secure peripherals in its own domain:
 - Writes have been intentionally skipped to prevent undesired consequences of blindly writing to a peripheral.
- Read secure peripherals (these are, by definition, outside of its own domain):
 - Writes have been intentionally skipped to prevent undesired consequences of blindly writing to a peripheral.

To build this system a BIF file will have to be created with four partitions:

- **zynqmp_fsbl**: Sets up device isolation and loads all other partitions.
- **zynqmp_pmufw**: Error handler and messenger.
- **mpsoc_preset_wrapper** (PL Bitstream): No real function in this system.
- **rpu-fi**: Application running on R5_0 that reads and writes to various memories and peripherals of the system.

To prevent a collision of messages between the FSBL, PMU, and application, it is necessary to modify the UART that the PMU will use. Recall that it was given both UART0 and UART1. Because the RPU must output on UART1, the PMU UART must be changed to UART0.

1. In the xapp1320_zcu102 tab, double-click **Board Support Package** (under psu_pmu_0/zynqmp_pmufw), and then click **Modify BSP Settings**
2. Select **standalone**.
3. Change the values for stdin and stdout to **psu_uart_0** by clicking in that field, and selecting **psu_uart_0** from the pull-down menu.
4. Select **OK**.
5. Select the xapp1320_zcu102 project in the Explorer Tab and then select from the top menu: **Project > Build Project** and wait for it to complete.

Note: For the following steps, `<build path> = <your lab location>/ps_isolation_lab/softwareDevelopment`

Note: For the following steps, all options not stated should be kept at default value.

1. Select **Xilinx > Create Boot Image**.
 - a. Architecture: **Zynq MP**
 - b. Check **Create new BIF file**
 - c. Output BIF file path: `<build path>/rpu-fi.bif`
 - d. Output path: `<build path>/BOOT.bin`

- e. Continue to next steps *without* clicking **Create Image**.
2. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/xapp1320_zcu102/export/xapp1320_zcu102/sw/xapp1320_zcu102_boot/fsbl.elf`
 - b. Partition Type: **bootloader**
 - c. Destination Device: **PS**
 - d. Destination CPU: **R5 Single**
3. Click **OK**.
4. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/xapp1320_zcu102/export/xapp1320_zcu102/sw/xapp1320_zcu102_boot/pmufw.elf`
 - b. Partition Type: **datafile**
 - Optional: This could be *pmu (loaded by bootrom)*.
 - c. Destination Device: **PS**
 - d. Destination CPU: **PMU**
5. Click **OK**.
6. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/xapp1320_zcu102/hw/xapp1320_zcu102.bit`
 - b. Partition Type: **datafile**
 - c. Destination Device: **PL**
7. Click **OK**.
8. Click **Add**.
 - a. File path: `<build path>/rpu-fi/Debug/rpu-fi.elf`
 - b. Partition Type: **datafile**
 - c. Destination Device: **PS**
 - d. Destination CPU: **R5 0**
9. Click **OK**.
10. The Create Boot Image window looks like [Figure 26](#).
11. Click **Create Image**. If asked to overwrite the previously created BIF/BIN file, select **OK**.




Figure 26: RPU Fault Injection System BIF Setup

Now that a `BOOT.bin` has been created, it can be copied to an SD card and used to boot the development board.

1. Copy `<build path>/BOOT.bin` to an SD card.
2. Set up two serial communication terminals to observe output on UART0 (PMU) and UART1 (RPU).
 - a. Baud rate: **115200**
 - b. Data bits: **8**
 - c. Parity: **None**
 - d. Stop bits: **1**
3. Set Boot Mode: **SD** (see [Figure 21](#)).
 - a. `MODE[3:0] > 1110 > ON-ON-ON-OFF`
4. Insert SD card.
5. Power up the board.

Figure 27 shows the RPU fault injection system output.

```

---Starting Fault Injection Test (Running on the RPU)---
(S)=Secure, (NS)=Non-Secure, (ND)=Not-Defined
Memories
RPU_OCM_S_BASE      : OCM Secure Memory Base Address in RPU Sub-System
RPU_OCM_NS_SHARED_BASE : OCM Non-Secure Memory Base Address in both RPU and APU Sub-Systems
RPU_ATCM_S_BASE     : R5 TCM Bank A Secure Memory Base Address in RPU Sub-System
RPU_DDR_LOW_S_BASE  : DDR Secure Memory Base Address in RPU Sub-System
RPU_DDR_LOW_NS_SHARED_BASE : DDR Non-Secure Memory Base Address in both RPU and APU Sub-Systems
APU_OCM_NS_SHARED_BASE : OCM Non-Secure Memory Base Address in both APU and RPU Sub-Systems
APU_DDR_LOW_NS_BASE : DDR Non-Secure Memory Base Address in APU Sub-System
APU_DDR_LOW_NS_SHARED_BASE : DDR Non-Secure Memory Base Address in Both APU and RPU Sub-Systems
UNDEFINED_DDR_MEMORY_BASE : Memory Base Address Not Defined in Any Sub-System

Peripherals
APU_UART0_NS_START  : Non-Secure UART0 in APU Sub-System
APU_SWD0_NS_START   : Non-Secure UART0 in APU Sub-System
APU_TTC0_NS_START   : Non-Secure UART0 in APU Sub-System
APU_UART0_NS_START  : Non-Secure UART0 in APU Sub-System
SHARED_GPIO_NS_START : Shared Non-Secure GPIO
RPU_UART1_S_START   : Secure UART1 in RPU Sub-System
RPU_SWD1_S_START    : Secure SWDT1 in RPU Sub-System
RPU_TTC1_S_START    : Secure TTC1 in RPU Sub-System
RPU_I2C1_S_START    : Secure I2C1 in RPU Sub-System

Read/Write Of Various Memories

Read/Write To RPU(S) Memory
  Reading RPU_OCM_S_BASE      ... PASS!
  Writing RPU_OCM_S_BASE     ... PASS!
  Reading RPU_DDR_LOW_S_BASE  ... PASS!
  Writing RPU_DDR_LOW_S_BASE  ... PASS!
  Reading RPU_ATCM_S_BASE     ... PASS!
  Writing RPU_ATCM_S_BASE     ... Skipped to avoid memory collision!

Read/Write Of RPU(NS) Memory
  Reading RPU_OCM_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!
  Writing RPU_OCM_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!
  Reading RPU_DDR_LOW_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!
  Writing RPU_DDR_LOW_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!

Read/Write Of APU(S) Memory
  ---This combination does not exist
  ---APU has no secure memory

Read/Write Of APU(NS)
  Reading APU_OCM_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!
  Writing APU_OCM_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!
  Reading APU_DDR_LOW_NS_BASE ... FAILED!
  Writing APU_DDR_LOW_NS_BASE ... FAILED!
  Reading APU_DDR_LOW_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!
  Writing APU_DDR_LOW_NS_SHARED_BASE ... PASS!

Read/Write Of ND Memory
  Reading UNDEFINED_DDR_MEMORY_BASE ... PASS!
  Writing UNDEFINED_DDR_MEMORY_BASE ... PASS!

Reading Sub-System Peripherals

APU Peripherals
  Reading APU_UART0_NS_START ... FAILED!
  Reading APU_SWD0_NS_START ... FAILED!
  Reading APU_TTC0_NS_START ... FAILED!

RPU Peripherals
  Reading RPU_UART1_S_START ... PASS!
  Reading RPU_SWD1_S_START ... PASS!
  Reading RPU_TTC1_S_START ... PASS!
  Reading RPU_I2C1_S_START ... PASS!

Shared Peripherals
  Reading SHARED_GPIO_NS_START ... PASS!

---Fault Injection Test Complete---

PMU Firmware 2020.3 Mar 5 2021 21:19:19
PMU_ROM Version: xpr-v8.1.0-0
EM: Enabling XMPU/XPPU interrupts
EM Module (MOD-0): Initialized.
DAP_WAKE (MOD-3): Initialized.
LEGACY PWR UP/DN/ISO (MOD-4): Initialized.
XPFW: Calling ROM PWRUP Handler..Done
XPFW: Calling ROM Isolation Handler..Done
XPFW: Calling ROM PWRUP Handler..Done
FSBL is running on RPU.
Warning: APU-only restart is not supported if FSBL boots on RPU.
XPfw_SchedulerRemoveTask: Removed 1 tasks

=====
EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XMPU DDR0 Read permission violation occurred
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0x100XXX
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: RPU0
EM: Poison register: 0x100000
=====

EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XMPU DDR0 Write permission violation occurred
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0x100XXX
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: RPU0
EM: Poison register: 0x100000
=====

EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XPPU Master ID access violation
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0xFF00000
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: RPU0
EM: Poison register : 0xFF9C0
=====

EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XPPU Master ID access violation
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0xFF150000
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: RPU0
EM: Poison register : 0xFF9C0
=====

EM: XMPU/XPPU violation occurred (ErrorId: 16)
EM: XPPU Master ID access violation
EM: Address of poisoned operation: 0xFF110000
EM: Master Device of poisoned operation: RPU0
EM: Poison register : 0xFF9C0
=====

```

Figure 27: RPU Fault Injection System Output

Note: In Figure 27, the PMU error messages correspond to each **Failed** attempt of the RPU system to access a restricted address. The **Failed** message is part of the application error handler. The PMU messages are part of the built-in PMU system error handler.

Secure Boot

Up to this point, the reference design is focused only on isolation. However, many applications using isolation may require the device to boot securely. In such applications, it is necessary to verify the authenticity of the boot image prior to its use. Encrypting the boot image is required if you intend to maintain the confidentiality of your IP.

Because, secure boot is an application note on its own, it is not specifically addressed here. Rather, all necessary modifications are included in the reference design zip file. The BIFs, keys,

and scripts to generate the same boot images previously built without secure boot are included and demonstrated how to:

- Add Authentication using RSA 4096 and SHA3 for the signature.
- Encrypt using AES-256 with galois counter mode (GCM).
- Use operational key (for good key management practices).
- Use physically unclonable function (PUF) for storing the user's encryption key in black (encrypted) form.

The following is a sample BIF:

```
//arch = zynqmp; split = false; format = BIN
the_ROM_image:
{
    // Authentication
    [pskfile]../../../../keys/psk0.pem
    [sskfile]../../../../keys/ssk0.pem
    [auth_params]ppk_select = 0

    // Encryption
    [keysrc_encryption]efuse_blk_key
    [bh_key_iv]../../../../keys/black_iv.txt

    // FSBL
    [fsbl_config]shutter=0x01000005E, opt_key
    [bootloader
        destination_cpu = r5-0
        authentication = rsa
        spk_select = spk-efuse
        spk_id = 0x00
        encryption = aes
        aeskeyfile = ../../keys/RedAESkey.nky
    ] ./xapp1320_zcu102/export/xapp1320_zcu102/sw/xapp1320_zcu102/boot/fsbl.elf

    // PMU Firmware
    [destination_cpu. = pmu
        authentication = rsa
        spk_select = user-efuse
        spk_id = 0x001
        encryption = aes
        aeskeyfile = ../../keys/pmuFW.nky
    ] ./xapp1320_zcu102/export/xapp1320_zcu102/sw/xapp1320_zcu102/boot/pmufw.elf

    // PL Bitfile
    [destination_device = pl
        authentication = rsa
        spk_select = user-efuse
        spk_id = 0x002
        encryption = aes
        aeskeyfile = ../../keys/pl_bitfile.nky
    ] ./xapp1320_zcu102/export/xapp1320_zcu102/hw/mpsoc_preset_wrapper.bit

    // R5-0 Application

    // A53-0 Application
    [destination_cpu = a53-0
```

```

authentication = rsa ,
spk_select     = user-efuse ,
spk_id        = 0x004 ,
encryption    = aes ,
aeskeyfile    = ../../keys/a530_hello.nky
] ./apu-fi/Debug/apu-fi.elf
}

```

The addition of secure boot does not require modification of the reference design. It only modifies the BIF used to generate the final BOOT.BIN file. It does, however, require you to prepare the following:

- A set of keys for RSA authentication and AES encryption (device and operational keys).
- A device that has the PUF provisioned.
- A device that has RSA key(s) provisioned.
- A device that has the AES key provisioned (BBRAM or EFUSE).

The included README.TXT file describes the directories containing all files both for the base reference design as well as for the modifications for secure boot.

Reference Design

You can download the [reference design files](#) for this application note from the Xilinx website.

[Table 3](#) shows the reference design matrix.

Table 3: Reference Design Matrix

Parameter	Description
General	
Developer name	Steven McNeil
Target devices	Zynq UltraScale+ devices
Source code provided	Yes
Source code format	C
Design uses code and IP from existing Xilinx application note and reference designs or third party	No
Static code analysis/MISRA C	No
Simulation	
Functional simulation performed	N/A
Timing simulation performed	N/A
Test bench used for functional and timing simulations	N/A
Test bench format	N/A
Simulator software/version used	N/A
SPICE/IBIS simulations	N/A

Table 3: Reference Design Matrix (Cont'd)

Parameter	Description
Implementation	
Synthesis software tools/versions used	N/A
Implementation software tools/versions used	N/A
Static timing analysis performed	N/A
Hardware Verification	
Hardware verified	Yes
Hardware platform used for verification	ZCU102 evaluation board

Conclusion

With the large number of processors on the Zynq UltraScale+ devices, designers need to ensure that code running on any processor or master is unable to interfere with or corrupt memory regions or peripherals that are not part of the master's subsystem. This application note describes how to use the hardware and software mechanisms provided by the XMPU, XPPU, and TZ for the isolation of subsystems. This functionality complements other isolation methods such as least privilege, hypervisors, and a trusted execution environment (TEE).

References

1. *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Register Reference* ([UG1087](#))
2. *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Technical Reference Manual* ([UG1085](#))
3. *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Processing System LogiCORE IP Product Guide* ([PG201](#))
4. *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Software Developer Guide* ([UG1137](#))
5. *Isolate Security-Critical Applications on Zynq UltraScale+ Devices* ([WP516](#))
6. [Arm TrustZone](#)

Revision History

The following table shows the revision history for this document.

Date	Version	Revision
07/21/2021	4.0	Updated for new version of software with complete rewrites for Vivado software and Vitis software 2021.1.
10/26/2020	3.2	Added a new section: Known Limitations to Isolation .
07/27/2020	3.1	Fixed broken arrows in Figure 13 .

Date	Version	Revision
04/30/2020	3.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Updated for new version of the software and to address issues from customer feedback. Added Secure Boot and Software Patch section.
06/21/2019	2.0	Updated for new version of the software and to address issues from customer feedback.
07/26/2017	1.0	Initial Xilinx release.

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